Mr Courtney was not, and consequently she met the costs of the household, amounting to £35,000, and she also spent £65,000 on renovations. She further averred that Mr Courtney gained financial and other benefits as a result of living with her for three years. Moreover, she claimed that she was not enriched by Mr Courtney's work on the property as she subsequently required the work redone professionally. 3 Both parties agreed that the relationship had ended by May 2013, and Mr Courtney moved out. 4 Following Mr Courtney's death, his executors raised this action in unjustified enrichment to recover the two sums of £50,000 paid by Mr Courtney to the defender, and a further £50,000 as recompense for outlays on materials and the cost of his labour to make improvements to the property in question. The claims were resisted on a number of grounds:
(i) that the availability of an alternative remedy -under section 28 of the 2006 Actprecluded resort to an "equitable remedy"; (ii) the pursuers had failed to show that any gains made by the defender were retained with "no legal justification"; and (iii) the pursuers had failed to demonstrate the costs of materials and labour for improvements. The third line of defence is essentially a matter of fact, and of proof, therefore no more will be said about it here. The ultimate decision in the case, and the interesting element from an enrichment perspective, rested upon the assertion, made once again by a Scottish court, that an enrichment claim is a subsidiary one. 5 In order to assess that assertion and its implications something must be said about subsidiarity.
C. UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: SUBSIDIARITY
Subsidiarity is a doctrine which is familiar, to some degree, to most legal systems that accept the doctrine of unjustified enrichment. 6 Broadly, if an individual can make the claim based upon an area of law other than unjustified enrichment s/he must raise that alternative claim. 7 The operational detail of this doctrine gives rise to variant approaches which can be (and are) taken by different legal systems. The law might insist upon the alternative claim being raised before the enrichment claim, or, at least, as an alternative or secondary cause of action. 8 Concomitantly, it is often assumed that the enrichment claim is excluded by the existence of the alternative cause of action, or, at least, that the enrichment claim is excluded in the absence of an exceptional or compelling reason to depart from the subsidiarity rule.
Scholars have been dubious about the extent and status of the doctrine of subsidiarity in Scottish enrichment law, particularly since the enrichment revolution; 9 but judicial decisions applying the rule are numerous 10 and it will not be easily uprooted. Nearly half a century ago, it was made clear by the Inner House, in Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Town Council, 11 that an action for recompense was a subsidiary one:
Recompense is an equitable doctrine. That being so, it becomes a sort of court of last resort, recourse to which can be had only when no other legal remedy is or has been available. If a legal remedy is available at the time when the action which gives rise to 7 The doctrine is complex, and alternative elements or interpretations of subsidiarity exist, but they are not discussed here in detail due to considerations of space and the fact the decision in Courtney is concerned with the version of subsidiarity concerning enrichment law's subservience to claims against the same defender but based upon another cause of action. The other versions include the subsidiarity of claims based upon a "general enrichment action", as opposed to claims which rest upon "specific" or already recognised enrichment actions, and the version concerned with third party enrichment: see D Visser, 'Unjustified Enrichment', in J M Smits (ed) A potentially important question, and something of a hanging question in the law generally -whether the subsidiarity doctrine's application has been expanded to apply to the whole of enrichment law and not just recompense, following the enrichment revolution -was affirmed at least as regards this case by agreement of the parties: paras 52-53, and 60. the claim for recompense has to be taken, then normally that legal remedy should be pursued to the exclusion of a claim for recompense. 12 Varney is one of a number of cases, 13 some revisited in Courtney, which make this point.
While those cases apply the subsidiarity doctrine, they also recognise that there might be exceptional circumstances in which the subsidiarity doctrine might be dispensed with. 14 Lord Beckett, in Courtney, accepted that the doctrine of subsidiarity was not an absolute one, such that it might "normally" apply, but not invariably. 15 He further accepted that where "special and strong circumstances" could be shown, that might justify dispensing with subsidiarity to allow recovery in unjustified enrichment. 16 However, he concluded that "special and strong circumstances" had not been shown in the present case. 17 17 The principal reason advanced by the pursuer was that Mr Courtney had been reluctant to make demands on the defender when her son was ill. Lord Beckett concluded that the deceased's "benevolent motivation need not have prevented him from taking legal advice" within the time limited period: para 69. 18 It is also worth bearing in mind that the decision in Courtney is a decision of a Lord Ordinary in the Outer House, who was bound by (or least faced with) Inner House authority in the form of Varney. There are academic treatments which argue that any subsidiarity doctrine should be more refined in the modern law, and only applicable to cases involving imposed enrichment: see H L MacQueen, 'Unjustified Enrichment, Subsidiarity and Contract', in V Palmer and E Reid (eds), Mixed Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 322, at 344-45 . If this were the case, then subsidiarity would have no application in a case such as Courtney, where the enrichment was by transfer, rather than imposition.
D. THE 2006 ACT -COHABITANTS' CLAIMS AT THE END OF A RELATIONSHIP
Since the pursuers' remedy in unjustified enrichment was precluded by the existence of a (now time-barred) claim under section the 2006 Act, it is necessary to examine the statutory provisions in more detail. Section 28 provides a statutory route by which cohabitants can seek financial compensation for any economic disadvantage suffered, or to redress any economic advantage gained by the other cohabiting party, during the course of the cohabiting relationship. Such a claim can only be made on the breakdown of the cohabitation and must be made within one year of the day on which the parties cease to cohabit. 19 A provision (with a time limit of six months) also exists in respect of cohabiting relationships which are terminated through the death of either party. 20 In this case, however, while the claim was raised after Mr Courtney's death, the cohabitation had ceased while he was still alive, so the correct route to claim would indeed have been section 28. The problem was that, during the year following the end of the cohabitation, Mr Courtney had not sought to recover any of these sums. 21 The only characteristic which all spouses and civil partners necessarily have in common is that they have formally registered their relationship. In other words, the 19 Section 28(8) provides the time limit. 20 Section 29 of the 2006 Act: here the court can only make an order from an intestate estate, and in making an order must have regard to the size and nature of the intestate estate, any benefit received by the surviving cohabitant as a result of the death, otherwise from the net intestate estate, and the nature and extent of other rights against or claims on the net intestate estate. 21 The reason given for his lack of action was that the defender's son was ill and later died: para 41. 22 Section 29A makes provision for extension of the time limits where there has been crossborder mediation in the dispute, but not otherwise. 23 Courtney, para 50. 24 Section 25(1)(a), with s25(1)(b) providing a comparable definition for same sex cohabiting couples.
one characteristic shared by all spouses and partners is the very characteristic that cohabitants by definition do not share. 25 Section 25(2) directs the courts to have regard to three factors when determining whether a couple are cohabitants. These are (i) the length of time during which they lived together; (ii) the nature of their relationship; and (iii) the nature and extent of any financial arrangements which subsisted during that period. 26 These factors were not canvassed in the present case, with the judge noting simply that it was "not in dispute that the deceased and the defender were cohabitants as defined by section 25". 27 Yet although the parties were apparently in agreement that sections 25 and 28 of the 2006 Act were relevant, it is not clear that this was in fact the case. The defender herself averred … the relationship between the defender and the deceased was a friendship rather than a lifetime commitment… When the house was purchased, they tried sharing a bedroom, but the relationship did not develop in that way and the deceased began to sleep downstairs… The deceased would have had no reasonable expectation that he would live there for the rest of his life. 28 While some married or cohabiting couples will occupy separate bedrooms, the picture Questions thus remain concerning the efficacy and fairness of the interaction between the statutory regime for cohabitants and the law of unjustified enrichment that will not be easily resolved. 29 One can be sympathetic to a concern that allowing an enrichment claim can unpick the provisions of the 2006 Act -an Act which was designed to cover the inevitably somewhat messy and imprecise 30 bundle of claims and counterclaims arising from a relationship recognised as having legal effects beyond those that would apply to two unrelated individuals. Why would any economically disadvantaged cohabitant utilise the statutory provisions if an enrichment action could avoid the detailed provisions of section 28, not least the absolute time limits, all embedded within a broad interpretative fairness framework? 31 And why should a cohabitant find it harder to recover an economic enrichment than someone who is not in a relationship recognised by the law as requiring a special regime? This is particularly the case since the remedies in unjustified enrichment and under statute are not identical: the common law regime allows claims to be raised over a longer (2012) 36 It has been decided that the character of the "novel jurisdiction to entertain cohabitants' financial claims" mandates a strict or restrictive interpretation of the procedural rules (time limits) in the enacting statute. 37 One could argue that that points towards a benign or a restrictive view of the appropriateness of an enrichment action. Later cases have suggested that while there is a "novel jurisdiction", 38 that should not necessarily be considered to be exclusive and comprehensive, 39 and the provisions are to be classified under existing categories of private law. 40 One might say, therefore, that the interpretation of sections 28 and 29 41 in decided cases could be explained narrowly as a specialised and narrow jurisdiction to raise a claim which does not disturb any other areas of law; or one might suggest that the strictness of the interpretation implicitly asserts the exclusivity or presumptive primacy of the new statutory rules.
E. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Likewise, one can be concerned that denying the enrichment claim inappropriately relegates the status of enrichment law to perpetual subsidiarity. Perhaps the nub of the problem is the instability of the core nature of an enrichment claim in Scotland. The instability is linked, as is becoming apparent from the pleading and tenor of decided cases, to the use of equitable terminology. Simply put, the question devolves into this: is an enrichment claim the vindication of a right vested in the impoverished party according to a notion of strict liability, or, is the profusion of "equity" and "equitable" language in back into the meaning of "unjustified" in the context of unjustified enrichment. On one view, with considerable authoritative pedigree, 42 Scots law takes the rather dry "absence of legal basis" approach to the meaning of "unjustified". That is a wide approach, which, it can be argued, is near to a general enrichment action 43 or at least a pervasive law of enrichment, which it is appropriate to control from a policy perspective by using a doctrine of subsidiarity. 44 It appears that the judicial inclination to interpret the statutory provisions as excluding a common law claim combines unforgivingly with the strict time limits in the 2006 Act: 
